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6 September 1960



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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iran: The combination of Soviet advances to Tehran and the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the extent of American aid and support, especially in the military field, is posing a threat to the United States' position in Iran, according to Ambassador Wailes. The ambassador fears that the Shah, in an effort to regain lost prestige, has "opened doors which may be difficult to close" and which can lead to a weakening of Iran's internal stability. Meanwhile, the new, nonpartisan cabinet of Prime Minister Sharif Emami "certainly seems no better than the last!" 20

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Laos: General Phoumi is bitter over the course of events in Laos and appears to be considering military action of some kind against the newly invested Souvanna Phouma government. Phoumi [redacted] made threats at his headquarters in Savannakhet on 2 September to divide Laos in two. According to Phoumi, his compromise settlement with Souvanna Phouma was only to gain time, and if he returned to Vientiane, 20

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He would have no choice but to "uphold Souvanna Phouma's policy of making Laos red."

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*The clandestine Pathet Lao radio, meanwhile, has responded to Souvanna Phouma's proposal to negotiate, stating that although the Pathet Lao movement welcomes this proposal, it demands the immediate removal of the "Phoumi clique" from the government, an immediate halt to the civil war, and diplomatic recognition of bloc countries.

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*Indonesia - Netherlands - Japan: Japan's decision on 3 September to cancel the visit of the Dutch aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to Yokohama, as the result of Indonesian pressures, has provoked a bitter reaction in The Hague. Foreign Minister Luns is considering withdrawing the Dutch ambassador from Tokyo but not breaking relations with Japan. The Karel Doorman, already en route to Japan when the visit was canceled, is returning to West New Guinea before departing on 17 September for Noumea, New Caledonia. Its return to New Guinea, an area which Indonesia claims, will undoubtedly be exploited by President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist party to stimulate further anti-Dutch feeling and demands for the "liberation" of West New Guinea. Sukarno is particularly eager for a national unifying issue which he can use to obscure the current domestic crisis precipitated by the army's ban of Communist activities in several areas.

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III. THE WEST

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Fabricio Ojeda, a leftist Venezuelan political leader who has spent considerable time in Cuba since late 1959, is planning a coup attempt in Venezuela with the support of Cuban officials. The move may be timed to exploit the current pro-Castro agitation in Venezuela following the recent OAS foreign ministers' meeting. Venezuela has more private US

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investment than any other Latin American country, and is currently a target of Castro's anti-US revolutionary program in the area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Dominican Republic: General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the Dominican dictator's son who is now in Europe, has almost certainly established contacts with the Soviet bloc. Anti-US, pro-Cuban, and pro-Soviet tirades are being continued in the government-controlled Dominican press and radiobroadcasts. An extensive propaganda campaign has been preparing the public for the dictator's resumption of the Presidency. [The US Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo fears the Dominican leader will kill many dissidents who belong to a coalition led by pro-US moderates.]

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Uneasy Situation Continues in Iran

Iran may move toward neutrality, accompanied by a softening of its policies toward the Soviet Union, unless a special effort is made to keep Iran in the Western camp, according to Ambassador Wailes. The ambassador recently expressed "deep concern" over the threat posed by the combination of Soviet advances to the Iranian Government and the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction over the extent of American aid, especially in the military field.

Wailes has also expressed a "distinct sense of uneasiness" over the domestic situation in Iran. He fears that the Shah, in an effort to regain personal prestige, has opened doors "which may be difficult to close." Nationalist and independent elements apparently are trying to exploit the cancellation of the recent elections and the promise of new elections. At least one major demonstration has been attempted but was dispersed by the police while the army was in readiness.

The committee to amend the electoral law held its first meeting at the palace on 3 September. The Shah, however, still faces the problem of achieving a compliant National Assembly while maintaining the semblance of free elections. The appointment of General Alavi-Moqadam, chief of the National Police, as minister of interior suggests that an attempt will be made to conduct orderly but controlled elections. Alavi-Moqadam has the reputation of being a tough policeman and is regarded as the counterweight to the power of intelligence (SAVAK) chief Bakhtiar. No date has yet been set for the new elections and the longer the delay the greater the danger of antiregime demonstrations. There will be increased danger of trouble from the volatile students if the elections are held while Tehran University and other schools are in session.

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The cabinet of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is about as unimpressive as its predecessor under Eqbal. Six of the 15 appointees were ministers in Eqbal's cabinet. The new foreign minister is 61-year-old Yadollah Azodi. Azodi is a career diplomat of long standing and is cautiously regarded as pro-American. His ill health and retirement status suggest his appointment is an interim choice and should end, for the time being at least, persistent rumors that Masud-Ansari, Iranian ambassador to the USSR, would be named foreign minister as an important step toward improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Laos

General Phoumi apparently has grown increasingly bitter over the train of events in Laos and is considering possible courses of action to redress the situation. Phoumi shows no intention of making an early return to Vientiane from his headquarters in Savannakhet to participate in the newly invested Souvanna Phouma government. [redacted]

[redacted] he may attempt to break southern Laos away from the Souvanna regime and has hinted that he might try to annex his area to Thailand. There is historical precedent in the existence until 1946 of a kingdom of southern Laos.]

Phoumi who also has talked vaguely of plans for a counter-coup, apparently is convinced that Souvanna Phouma's policies are tantamount to turning Laos over to the Communists. His fears for his safety in Vientiane so long as Kong Le remains in a position of power have some justification. Phoumi is also aware of rumors of Pathet Lao plans to apprehend or assassinate him and other members of his faction.]

The Pathet Lao meanwhile have responded to Souvanna Phouma's offers to negotiate by setting "minimum conditions" for such talks. The terms, as broadcast over the clandestine Pathet Lao radio, include the immediate removal of the "Phoumi clique" from the government, a cessation of fighting, diplomatic recognition by Laos of all countries having "different social and political systems," and the acceptance of these countries' economic assistance.] [redacted]

Possible Cuban Involvement in Subversive Activity in Venezuela

Fabricio Ojeda, a leftist Venezuelan political leader who has spent considerable time in Cuba since late 1959, is organizing a coup attempt against President Betancourt's coalition with the support of Cuban officials.

Cuba reportedly has arranged to supply arms and training facilities for Venezuelans. The move may be timed to exploit the current political tension in Venezuela and the threat to the coalition arising from Foreign Minister Arcaya's refusal--in opposition to his government's policy--to sign the resolution adopted by the OAS foreign ministers in San Jose against extracontinental intervention in the hemisphere. A series of pro-Castro demonstrations have already erupted in Venezuela apparently in support of Arcaya, who, like Ojeda, is a member of the Democratic Republican Union, a stanch pro-Castro party which is a dissatisfied component of the coalition.

Venezuela, which has the largest US investment--about three billion dollars--of any Latin American country and has a large leftist element, is a logical target of Castro's anti-US program in the area. Castro has maintained close liaison with a large number of Venezuelan dissident leaders--including Communists and the Marxist element which defected from Betancourt's own Democratic Action party--possibly with the ultimate objective of overthrowing Betancourt, who is hostile toward him. A Cuban national, favorable to the Cuban regime, recently informed a US official that Castro had sponsored in early 1960 a paramilitary training program for Venezuelan leftists who are to play a role in a future move against Betancourt. A prominent Venezuelan newsman recently wrote that Castro was bribing Venezuelan journalists and organizing "a powerful army within Venezuela" to promote a Castro-style coup. Betancourt's press secretary advised the US Embassy in Caracas in August that a top Venezuelan Communist had received \$500,000 from Cuba to convert the party's weekly paper into a daily.

Trujillo Probably Seeking Contacts with Communist Bloc

[General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the Dominican dictator's son who is in Europe, has almost certainly made contacts with the Soviet bloc. He reportedly has been given broad authority to negotiate commercial and political agreements with European and Soviet bloc countries.]

The regime-controlled radio and press have become increasingly pro-Cuban, pro-USSR, and bitterly anti-American. Since 25 August, Radio Caribe which reportedly is owned by the Trujillo family has been using items attributed to TASS. Radio Caribe complained that the homes occupied by diplomats of those countries that have broken diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic "need to be fumigated and left ready for more pleasing diplomats--and these could be even those from the lands of the Mandarins." The radio announced on 25 August that negotiations were under way to procure the services of the Chinese Communists' New China News Agency.

Trujillo may soon resume the office of President in response to "popular demand." In order to maintain a facade of legality, the puppet President Balaguer, who already has asked Trujillo to replace him, may appoint Trujillo secretary of state for the armed forces--the next in line in the succession to the presidency--before resigning from office.

The US Embassy reported on 25 August--the day before diplomatic relations were broken and the embassy reduced to a consulate--that a coalition of anti-Trujillo opponents led by pro-US moderates and extending from university students on the left to top-level military officers on the right was being formed. There is a danger that Trujillo may attempt to liquidate all suspected dissidents before the coalition has an opportunity to act. Recent

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reports suggest that the number of Trujillo-directed assassinations has been on the rise.

The US air attaché had reports on 26 August that government troops supported by tanks were concentrating against an insurgent force forming in the hills near San Jose de Ocoa where anti-Trujillo dissidence has been strong.]

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